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Abstract
As online markets for the exchange of goods and services become more common, the study of markets com-
posed at least in part of autonomous agents has taken on increasing importance. In contrast to traditional complete-
information economic scenarios, agents that are operating in an electronic marketplace often do so under considerable
uncertainty. In order to reduce their uncertainty, these agents must learn about the world around them. When an agent
producer is engaged in a learning task in which data collection is costly, such as learning the preferences of a con-
sumer population, it is faced with a classic decision problem: when to explore and when to exploit. If the agent has a
limited number of chances to experiment, it must explicitly consider the cost of learning (in terms of foregone proﬁt)
against the value of the information acquired. Information goods add an additional dimension to this problem; due
to their ﬂexibility, they can be bundled and priced according to a number of different price schedules. An optimiz-
ing producer should consider the proﬁt each price schedule can extract, as well as the difﬁculty of learning of this
schedule.
In this paper, we demonstrate the tradeoff between complexity and proﬁtability for a number of common price
schedules. We begin with a one-shot decision as to which schedule to learn. Schedules with moderate complexity are
preferred in the short and medium term, as they are learned quickly, yet extract a signiﬁcant fraction of the available
proﬁt. We then turn to the repeated version of this one-shot decision and show that moderate complexity schedules, in
particular two-part tariff, perform well when the producer must adapt to nonstationarity in the consumer population.
When a producer can dynamically change schedules as it learns, it can use an explicit decision-theoretic formulation
to greedily select the schedule which appears to yield the greatest proﬁt in the next period. By explicitly considering
the both the learnability and the proﬁt extracted by different price schedules, a producer can extract more proﬁt as it
learns than if it naively chose models that are accurate once learned.
Keywords: Online learning, information economics, model selection, direct search
11 Introduction
The developmentof electronic markets for the exchangeof goods and services (such as MAGNET [6], eMediator [19]
or the University of Michigan AuctionBot [25]) has produced a need to study the behavior of economies composed
wholly or in part of autonomous agents. These agents typically do not have the sort of rich information and so-
phisticated reasoning attributed to humans, and so traditional economic approaches based on ideas such as common
knowledge are not necessarily applicable. Our research has focused on the study of economies of producer and con-
sumer agents where information goods are the objects of exchange. In particular, we are interested in how an agent
producer of information goods can efﬁciently learn about an unknown consumer population.
Electronic information goods are very ﬂexible. In contrast to physical goods, marginal costs are negligible and
nearly limitless bundling and unbundling of these items is possible. Consequently, producers can offer complex
pricing and bundling schemes that would be infeasible for traditional commerce in physical goods. When articles
have a very low marginal cost, it is almost always advantageous to include them in a bundle if any consumer values
them positively. Considering only pricing structures that are based on the number of items in a bundle, and not on
the identity of the items or the identity of the consumer, there are families of such pricing schedules with one free




is the total number of different information goods under consideration. These different families
of schedules approximate consumer demand with different degrees of precision, thereby yielding different proﬁts.
It wouldseem reasonableto assume that a producerwith morefree (andindependent)pricingparametersto control
will wanttouseallofthoseparameters,sinceitwill beabletoﬁttheconsumerdemandcurvemoreprecisely. However,
when a producer faces uncertainty about the nature of consumer demand, the situation is not so straightforward.
Optimal pricing under more complex schemes demands more knowledge about consumer preferences than pricing
undersimpleschemesrequires. Inaddition,differentscheduleswiththesamenumberofparametersmayhavedifferent
learning curves. Learning about consumer preferencestakes time; meanwhile, the ﬁrm is earning less than the optimal
proﬁt. In a world in which a producerhas a limited number of chances to interact with a consumer population,the cost
of learning becomes very important; learning a complex schedule is not useful if the producer does not have sufﬁcient
opportunity to recoup learning costs.
Aspects of our problem have been studied by prior authors. There is an extensive economic literature on how
a ﬁrm can use multi-parameter pricing schedules to extract greater surplus when the distribution of consumers is
known, but the ﬁrm cannot tailor individual-dependent prices; see Wilson [24] for a thorough overview. Maskin and
Riley [15] present a method for deriving the most proﬁtable unconstrained nonlinear pricing scheme when consumers
are differentiated by a single taste parameter for which the distribution is known. Economists and others have studied
how agents optimally choose between competing opportunities of unknown reward, often referred to as multi-armed
banditproblems[23]. In banditproblems,an agent weighs the beneﬁtof gaininginformationby experimentingagainst
the cost of experimentation (manifested as foregone short-run proﬁts). Rothschild has studied how a ﬁrm chooses a
one-parameter linear price when it faces uncertain consumer preferences [18]. Braden and Oren [2] have found that
when the distribution of consumer demands is unknown, the desire to learn leads to lower prices in early periods.
The machine learning community has also considered the problem of efﬁcient learning. The problem of how to
determine an optimal sequence of actions, when there is a tradeoff between exploration and exploitation, is a primary
focus of the reinforcement learning literature. Sutton and Barto [20] provide an excellent overview.
Problemsinwhichanagentacquiresdataincrementallyandmustinterleavelearningwithactingintheenvironment
(as opposed to processing a large dataset ofﬂine and then selecting an action) are referred to as on-line learning
problems. Researchers in both machine learning [1] and optimal control [8] have examined this problem, typically
asking questions such as how to learn a model with the smallest number of queries. Thus, they do not consider an
economically-sensible objective function, such as our objective of maximizing aggregate payoff net of any costs of
learning. When an agent is able to select data points to examine she has a decision problem in which there is a trade-
off between the opportunity cost of further exploration and the value of the information acquired. This is known as a
problem with active data selection. Thrun and Møller [21] survey common techniques, most of which assume that the
problem is stationary.
In our research, an agent producer of information goods selects parameter values that deﬁne a price schedule
offeredto an unknownconsumerpopulation. This agent can select from schedules of differingcomplexityto represent
the consumer population. As it gathers evidence, the agent updates its beliefs about the optimal parameter values. We
point out that a price schedule can be thought of as a model of consumer demand. If a consumer’s valuation for each
good in a bundle were known, it could be expressed as a nonlinear price schedule charging that consumer’s valuationfor each good. Other price schedules are less precise, but still approximate consumer demand.
Several assumptions distinguish our on-line learning problem with active data selection from prior research. First,
weassumethattheproducer’sgoalis economicallysensible: tomaximizeaggregateproﬁts. Theproduceris concerned
not only with the proﬁts it can expect once it ﬁnds a good schedule, but also with the lower proﬁts earned while
uncovering this good schedule. Second, we allow the environment to change over time. Thus the producer must also
consider the degree to which proﬁts are affected by changes in its environment and how quickly it can “relearn” a
schedule. Finally, we endow our ﬁrm with no knowledge of its environment. These features render optimal control
methods intractable, and point to simulation as the appropriate tool for studying this problem.
We begin with a ﬁxed-schedule problem in which a producer chooses a single schedule, then learns and updates
beliefs about the optimal value of the parameters for that schedule. Simpler schedules outperform those that are more
complex over the short and medium run, due to the higher costs of learning more parameters. The two-part tariff
performs especially well. We then allow consumer demand to change over time and evaluate schedule performance
over a range of frequencies of change. Finally, we demonstrate how a producer can improveits proﬁts by dynamically
changing between schedules as it learns so as to combine the learnability of simpler schedules with the higher proﬁts
of more complex schedules.
2 Modeling
In this section we present our model of producer and consumer behavior, describe the different price schedules, and
summarize the proﬁts they extract under complete information assumptions.
2.1 Consumer Model
In each period,a monopolistoffersconsumers a new set of
￿
articles priced accordingto a price schedule. Consumers
are rational utility maximizers. That is, they know their preferences and, on every iteration, will act so as to maximize
their expectedutility. We assume consumerpreferencesfollow a simple two-parametermodeloriginallyintroducedby
Chuang and Sirbu [5], and described in our previous work [4, 13]. This model has the advantage of being analytically
tractable while still providing signiﬁcant nonlinearities in consumer demand when consumers are heterogeneous. The
model consists of two parameters:
￿ , which indicates a consumer’s value for its most-preferred article, and
￿
, which
indicates the fraction of the
￿
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This equation produces a downward-sloping line representing consumer valuations, as shown in Figure 1. In
practice, consumers can only purchase integer quantities of articles, as indicated by the solid rectangles. It is worth
notingthat consumerscan choose which articles that theywish to consume; the produceronly prices articles according
to the order in which they are consumed. For example, the ﬁrst article consumed might cost $5, regardless of which
article the consumer chooses to read.
As we assume that the producer can produce an additional copy of any article without additional cost, the socially



















- for the entire population. A ﬁrm that couldobserveeach consumer’s
￿
￿ could perfectly
price discriminate by making a take-it-or-leave-it offer tailored to each individual and extract this entire surplus. This
serves as an upper bound for the maximum proﬁt that a monopolist could earn. (Of course, since a producer cannot
actuallypricediscriminatebetweenconsumers,it is unlikelytoreachthisboundwheninteractingwithaheterogeneous
consumer population.)
We assumethatthe consumerpopulationwill changeovertime. Thereareseveralwaysin whichthis couldhappen:
for example, consumer preferences could change, the population could evolve as consumers leave and are replaced by
new consumers, or the span of market facing the producer could change due to the introduction of other producers. In
Section 4 we consider the case in which the extant consumer population periodically is removed and replaced by new
consumers drawn from a static distribution 1.















Figure 1: Consumer Valuation under the Chuang and Sirbu model.
2.2 Producer Model
We focus on the producer and how its decision as to what it should learn leads to differences in performance. The
producer’s goal is to maximize its proﬁt aggregated over time 2. This depends on the proﬁt from the current schedule,
the cost of learning better price parameters, and the value of learning as realized through improvedfuture proﬁtability.
We focus on a monopolist producer interacting with a consumer population. There are two possible explanations
for the monopolist assumption: the ﬁrst is that many information goods, such as journal articles and audio ﬁles,
are protected by copyright, thereby preventing other producers from selling them. Secondly, the economy we are
considering may be part of a larger system in which the producers have subdivided the consumer market into separate
niches. Within each niche, a single producer acts as a local monopolist. We have studied conditions sufﬁcient for this
to occur elsewhere [3].
We assume that the producer can offer exactly one price schedule in a given period. Since a producer cannot
distinguish between consumers, offering multiple schedules simultaneously could confuse the learning problem, as
a producer may not be able to tell whether a schedule performs poorly because it is not valued by the consumer
population, or whether one of its other offerings is simply valued more highly. The produceroffers a pricing schedule,
receives feedback in the form of proﬁt earned, and uses this to select new prices. In Section 5, we allow the producer
to select a new schedule. The producer does not have knowledge of or tight beliefs about the distribution of consumer
preferences, and thus tries to learn only the direct relationship between price schedule parameters and proﬁt.
We are studying the question of which schedule to learn, rather than how to optimally learn a given schedule.
Therefore, we selected an off-the-shelf optimization algorithm to use in learning prices 3. We use amoeba [17], a
variant of the Nelder-Mead direct search method for nonlinear optimization [16, 22], as a learning algorithm. Amoeba
is a hillclimbing algorithm particularly well-suited to the types of proﬁt landscapes we are studying. It works by





￿ is the number of parameters in the price schedule). The worst
pointis reﬂectedthroughthecentroidoftheconvexhullformedbythe other
￿ points. Ifthis producesanimprovement,
the process is repeated. Otherwise, the worst pointis contractedtowardthe centroidof the hull andthe new worst point
is reﬂected. This producesa back-and-forthﬂippingupthe gradientofa landscapewhichgivesamoebaits name. (This
is only a rough sketch of the algorithm; a detailed description is provided in the references above.) Amoeba performs
well on discontinuous, multimodal, terraced surfaces such as the ones induced by these price schedules. This is due
both to the fact that amoeba does not explicitly use gradient information to select new points to explore and also the
fact that amoeba uses a widely separated set of points to choose new points to explore, as opposed to just examining
the proﬁt landscape in its immediate neighborhood. This allows amoeba to skip over ridges and local optima.
2In some cases, a producer may want to discount the value of future proﬁt. Although we do not treat it explicitly, it is straightforward to
incorporate a discounting factor into our results.
3It is possible that the question of what to learn might be sensitive to the choice of learning algorithm. For example, different price schedules
might have different algorithms that perform optimally on them, and the improvement from moving to a better algorithm might be sufﬁcient for
some methods as to change the ranking of payoffs from the various schedules. This remains an open question for our problem.
3Pricing Schedule Parameters Optimal Proﬁt Description
Pure Bundling
￿ .875 Consumers pay a ﬁxed price




￿ .875 Consumers pay a ﬁxed price







￿ 1.037 Consumers pay a subscription fee
￿ , along
with a ﬁxed price






￿ 1.037 Consumers have a choice between a per-
article price















￿ 1.094 Consumers pay a price
￿
￿
































































Column 3 denotes the optimal proﬁt per good
sold that can be earned by each schedule.
2.3 Price Schedules
The space of schedules that we explore (presented in Table 1) is larger than that typically considered in the sale of
physical goods. The reason for this is that digital goods typically have a high ﬁxed cost, but negligible marginal cost.
Once a single digital copy of a good, such as a newspaper article, is produced, copies can be made virtually for free.
This makes bundling of articles into collections an attractive strategy for dealing with consumer heterogeneity [5, 7].
If an article is valued by any consumer, including it in a bundle increases the bundle’s aggregate value.
The calculation of optimal proﬁt with perfect information for each schedule is described in more detail in our pre-
vious work [4]; we simply summarize those results here to provide a benchmark for the best possible proﬁt that could
be obtained from a schedule once all information is learned. Table 1 shows that as the number of pricing parameters
increases, the potential proﬁt a schedule can extract is increased. We refer to this as a schedule’s precision: what
fraction of available proﬁt is it capable of capturing? Another factor, which is not reﬂected in the above table, is a
schedule’s complexity, which indicates the difﬁculty of learning the optimal parameters of a price schedule. Complex-
ity allows us to compare the learnability of different schedules by estimating both how well they will perform once
learned, and the cost of learning them. This will be further explored in Section 5, when we examine the producer’s
decision process as it repeatedly chooses price schedules.
3 Learning parameters for a one-time schedule choice
In the simplest formulation of our problem, a producer selects a single price schedule and is then locked into this
decision. The producer is free to dynamically change its price parameters every period, but the selection of a schedule
is ﬁxed.
In order to compare the performance of each schedule as prices are learned, we conducted a set of experiments in
which amoeba was run on the landscape induced by a randomly generated consumer population and a price schedule.
In these experiments, we generated a population of 1000 consumers.
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￿ was ﬁxed at 10,
so as to remain consistent with the analytical results summarized in Table 1. This produces a consumer population in
which each consumer has the same value for its most-preferred article, but consumers vary in the number of articles











goods. The producer interacted with a ﬁxed
population for 10000 iterations. Results are averaged over 100 runs.











. (Note that the time axis is
log scale.) Each line indicates the average cumulative (per-article, per-customer) proﬁt for a particular schedule. For
example, the value of about 1 for mixed bundling at iteration 10 in the left-hand graph in Figure 2 means that over the
ﬁrst 10 iterations, proﬁt averaged 1 (so cumulative proﬁt is approximately 10). The total expected proﬁt earned up to
time
) is the height of the curve at
) multiplied by






























































































Figure 2: Learning curves for each of the six price schedules. The
￿ axis is number of iterations (log scale) and the
￿












well, dominating for the next 100 periods. After this point, the cost of learning the nonlinear schedule has been
absorbed, and nonlinear pricing becomes the most effective strategy. Also worth noting is the poor performance of
block pricing; even though it is able to extract more proﬁt under complete information than either two-parameter







are shown on the right-handgraph in Figure 2. Again, two-part tariff per-
forms well in the short and medium run before being overtaken by nonlinear pricing. The single-parameter schedules
(pure bundling and linear pricing) are simply not able to keep up due to their low precision.
While the theoretical properties of each price schedule tell us the maximal proﬁt they can achieve, the rate at
which that proﬁt is reached is dependent upon the structure of the proﬁt landscape. The experiments in Figure 2 help












. Recall that a consumer is described by the fraction of articles she desires. Since
consumers can only purchase integer quantities of articles, as the number of articles increases, each consumer is able
to target more precisely what she wants, reducing the discontinuity in the landscape. Increasing the number of articles
also emphasizes the heterogeneity in the consumer population, making consumers “more different” from each other
and thereby reducing the proﬁt (per consumer) that can be extracted using a single schedule.






. Learning does not actually begin with this schedule until iteration 102.
Also, note the difference in performance for both mixed bundling and block pricing as the number of articles
is increased. In the case of mixed bundling, proﬁts fell off, whereas block pricing performed better as the number
of articles increased. To understand why the performance of mixed bundling falls off, consider the topographical
depiction of the mixed bundling proﬁt landscape shown in Figure 3. Since mixed bundling offers consumers a choice
between pure bundling and per-article pricing, one solution is to only ﬁnd the bundle price, setting the per-article price
so high that no one will choose it. This places the produceron the large light-grayregionof the landscape. In this case,
changing the per-article price a little has no change in proﬁt (since no one was buying per-article) and so the producer
will remain in that region. The larger this region is, the more likely that a learner will ﬁnd itself there. Since the size
of the bundle price is dependent upon the number of articles offered, as
￿
increases, a greater fraction of the proﬁt
landscape is taken up by this region.
In contrast, block pricing performs better as the number of articles offered is increased. Recall that the third
parameter of a block pricing schedule (






, consumers typically value only a few articles, and so most values of
￿ do not






, consumers will value a larger number of
articles, andsoblockpricingis ableto effectivelyﬁndtwo pricesthatcaptureboththehighvalueplacedonthe ﬁrst few
articles purchasedand the low value for the remainingarticles. This provides a lesson for designers of price schedules:
adding additional schedule parameters requires a producer to consider not only the ability to extract additional proﬁt
at a schedule’s optima, but also the way in which the addition of extra parameters will affect the proﬁt landscape.












. Unlike mixed bundling, it contains an easy-to-climb hill, and many non-optimal values






















































Figure 4: Two-part tariff (left) and mixed bundling (right) landscapes. Even though they have the same number of
parameters and the same optimal proﬁt, their landscapes are very different.
have relatively high proﬁt, making exploration less costly. Additionally, there are no large plateaus, making it easy
to move between optima. This is discussed further in Section 4. Figure 4 shows the landscapes for mixed bundling
and two-part tariff. As we can see, even though they have the same number of parameters and the same optimal
proﬁt, the search spaces are quite different. As we discussed previously, the mixed bundling landscape contains the
pure bundling and linear pricing landscapes as subspaces, with the pure bundling solution creating a large ﬂat region.
Because of this, even though these two-parameter schedules have the same potential optimal proﬁt, the two-part tariff
performs better on average after learning is complete, particularly for low
￿
. Since two-part tariff’s parameters are
tightly coupled (as the fee increases a bit, the per-article price falls) the resulting landscape has a nice gradient that a
learnercan ascend. Recall that the graphsin Figure 2 show results averagedoverseveral runswith randomizedstarting
values. The global peak of the mixed bundling landscape was found less often than that of two-part tariff.
Theseresultshighlighttheexploration-exploitationtradeoffinvolvedinselectingschedulesofdifferentcomplexity.
While more highly parameterized schedules can potentially ﬁt consumer demand more precisely, simpler, less precise
schedules can be more effective in the short run due to their learnability. Additionally, some schedules may be less
robust to a change in model parameters, such as number of articles. Therefore, it is important to consider not only the









































￿ Optimal Opt. (ﬁxed)
Pure Bundle 0.847 0.955 1.066 1.079 1.122 0.901
Linear 0.900 0.904 0.905 0.907 0.910 0.900
Two-Part 0.853 1.034 1.144 1.186 1.232 1.071
Mixed 1.016 1.090 1.146 1.154 1.240 1.071
Block 0.855 0.994 1.076 1.253 1.279 1.063
Nonlinear — — 1.112 1.312 1.393 1.205
Table 2: Time-averaged proﬁts for each schedule for several values of shock interval
￿
, using 10 consumers. The






; this represents the upper limit on what can be obtained






for a producer using
a ﬁxed price schedule, rather than adapting.
The analysis in this section provides a recipe for a producer choosing a single schedule: ﬁnd the point on the time
(
￿ ) axis corresponding to the number of iterations it will interact with a consumer population and select the schedule
with the highest area under its curve up to that point. (If the ending time is not known with certainty, use an expected
utility calculation for each possible ending time.)
While this is an interesting initial step, it assumes that the producer starts with no information about the consumer
population. In the following sections, we will relax our assumptions about nonstationarity and allow our producer
to track a changing consumer population. We will then allow the producer to dynamically change schedules, using
information gained from simpler schedules to “bootstrap” into more complex schedules.
4 Examining Nonstationarity Further
One interpretation of the assumptions of the previous section is that the producer is in a nonstationary environment
where the changes are so dramatic that all previous learning is without value to the producer. This is just one end of
a spectrum of potential change. In this section, we examine less dramatic nonstationary environments, with an eye
toward the question of selecting a schedule that is robust to periodic changes in the consumer population.
Inourmodel,theconsumerpopulationissubjectedtoperiodicshocks. Whenashockoccurs,theexistingconsumer
population is replaced with new consumers drawn from a ﬁxed distribution.
We compared the performance of each schedule to that of a producer who knows the parameters of the consumer
distribution and selects a ﬁxed schedule and prices targeted to this distribution. In other words, this is the best that a
producer could hope to do (in expectation) without adapting to population shocks. For this experiment, we allowed
shocks to occur every 10, 100, 1000 and 10000 iterations. Before the experiment began, the producer was allowed to
learn on a ﬁxed population until it converged on a solution, so as to eliminate initial transients. The experiment was
ran for many (typically millions) periods, and results were averaged across shocks. The results from these simulations
are presented in Table 2.
As we can see fromTable 2, whenthe consumerpopulationis changingrapidly,a producercan do better by simply
staying in place. The proﬁts from not changing a “good” schedule even as the consumer population changes, depicted
in the ﬁnal column, are greater than the proﬁts of trying to adapt to frequent changes, depicted in the second column.
The producer simply doesn’t have enough time to make up proﬁts lost due to learning. (This advantage is dependent
upon new consumers being drawn from a stationary distribution; if the distribution of potential consumers changes
over time, then adaptation is more likely to be a successful strategy.) As the shock rate decreases, learning becomes
more useful, with the two-parameter schedules again performing well. One result worth noting is the performance
of nonlinear pricing. In this experiment, nonlinear pricing did quite well, whereas in the experiments in Section 3, it
initially performed poorly. This is a direct result of the way in which the experiments were performed. In the experi-
ments depicted in Figure 2, the producerwas started cold on a stationary population. In the experimentsummarized in
Table 2, the producerwas ﬁrst allowed to learn on a stable population to eliminate the initial transient, then the shocks
began. This illustrates the huge difference that initial knowledge about the consumer population, or, alternatively, the
ability to learn about the population before the experiment begins, can play in selecting a price schedule.
A persistent question in our research is identifying characteristics of different landscapes that make them easier
or harder to learn. For example, two-part tariff appears quite resistant to nonstationarity; the reason for this can be
seen by examining a topological depiction of the two-part tariff landscape, shown in Figure 5. The landscape consists







Figure 5: One instance of a two-part tariff landscape, as seen from above. Notice the plateau at the top of the hill, and
the sharp drop to the northwest. Dots indicate the global optima from 100 different randomly generated landscapes.
of a single large hill with a large mostly-ﬂat region at the top. The “northeast” face of this hill contains a sharp
dropoff. Optima are scattered on this plateau, all with similar proﬁts. Once amoeba ﬁnds this plateau, it is easy to
move between optima without signiﬁcant cost. As the consumer population changes, the exact angle and direction of
the dropoff changes, moving the plateau somewhat, but the landscape retains its overall structure. Superimposed on
the landscape shown in Figure 5 are the results of running amoeba on 100 randomly generated landscapes. As we can
see from this ﬁgure, optima tend to be located on or near the plateau, regardless of the particular instantiation of the
consumer population. This implies that it is easy for a producer to track consumer change using this schedule. Even
though the optima move, the landscape’s overall structure is stable enough that, once a producer ﬁnds the plateau at
the top, it is able to stay on it and easily track optima.
5 Dynamic Schedule Selection
Intheprevioussections, wehaveassumedthatthechoiceofapricingscheduleis aonce-and-for-alldecision. However,
it may be more advantageous for a producer to instead change the schedule it is offering as information is acquired.
Initially, a simple schedule is learned, allowing a producer to accrue some proﬁt quickly. As information about
consumer preferences is gathered, the producer eventually switches to a higher-precision schedule, thereby earning
higher proﬁts. To get an intuitive idea of how this works, consider two-part tariff, a two parameter schedule, and linear
pricing, a one parameter schedule. As we saw in Section 3, linear pricing is easily learned, but two-part tariff yields
higher proﬁt once learned. Now consider that linear pricing is simply two-part tariff with a subscription fee of zero.
This means that when a producer has learned a linear schedule, it has learned a slice of the landscape for two-part
tariff. It need not start over, since this solution is hopefully somewhat near to the solution in the higher-dimensional
space. In this section, we will make this idea more concrete and describe it in terms of a decision procedure that a
producer can engage in to select the optimal sequence of schedules to learn with.
5.1 Models and Model Families
Recall that a priceschedulecan bethoughtof as a modelofconsumerdemand. Inthis context,we use the term‘model’
to refer to a set of features of interest and an assignment of values to each of those features. If a consumer’s valuation
for each good in a bundle were known, it could be expressed as a nonlinear price schedule charging that consumer’s
valuation for each good. This is a model which contains
￿
features, one for each article, and a numerical valuation
associated with each feature. Other price schedules are less precise, but still act as models of consumer demand.
8Pricing Schedule Number of Parameters Proﬁt Precision
Pure Bundling 1 .875 0.76
Linear Pricing 1 .875 0.76
Two-part Tariff 2 1.037 0.90
Mixed Bundling 2 1.037 0.90
Block Pricing 3 1.094 0.95
Nonlinear Pricing
￿ 1.152 1.0





























To begin, we introduce some terminology to help with the decision problem of selecting price schedules. We refer
to the set of all price schedules of a given type as a model family. A model family is the set of all models that share
the same set of features; however, there is no binding of value assignments to these features in a model family. For
example,the familyoflinearpricingmodelsconsists ofall modelswhichusea singleparametertorepresentper-article
price. When a producer decides to use linear pricing, it is actually selecting a model family; it then searches through
the space of models in that family for the one that maximizes proﬁt.
A model family can be characterized by its precision and its complexity. Precision indicates the fraction of single-
period proﬁt that the best model in this family can capture. In other words, precision tells us how well we can hope
to do using a model from a given family. For example, we see from Table 1 that linear pricing yields a maximum
per-consumer, per-article proﬁt of 0.875. If the total possible proﬁt available is 1.75, then the family of linear pricing























. Precision for each family of price schedules is shown in Table 3.
Within a model family, we can also consider the accuracy of a model. A model’s accuracy indicates the fraction
of proﬁt it extracts, relative to the optimal model in its family. If
￿
￿
￿ is the optimal model in a given family, then the



















￿ indicates the proﬁt yielded by a model. For example, if we had





















While precision and accuracy serve to capture the static characteristics of a model and its family, they don’t say
anything about how easily a model family can be learned. To capture this, we must characterize a model family’s

















indicates the number of samples




. The more complex a model
family is, the longer a learner will need (on average) to attain a given accuracy. Of course, more complex model
families will likely havea higherprecision,assumingthat the behaviorof the agentbeingmodeledis actually complex.
The actual calculation of complexitywill depend uponthe speciﬁcs of the domain at interest. In some cases, either
PAC-learning estimates [12] or Monte Carlo estimation [14] can be applied. Unfortunately, our in our model neither
are applicable,since the trials (price-proﬁtofferings)are not independentand some schedules yield higherreward than
others, rather than there being a set of schedules that are “equally bad.”
Empirically,we havefoundthatasigmoidfunctionworkswellforapproximatingcomplexity,atleast whenapplied
to pricing data. Since proﬁt landscapes tend to be composed of large plateaus, dotted with hills that are easy to locate
andascendinitially,butwhichhavemultiplepeaks,we wouldlike toestimatecomplexitywith afunctionthatincreases
steeply initially, then tails off as it approaches an asymptote. We have had good results when applying the following
formula as an estimate of the solution quality

























































> is the dimensionality of the model family. An analytical proof of complexity is difﬁcult to construct in
a domain-independent manner; our current work involves using landscape theory [10, 11] to characterize theoretical
properties of proﬁt landscapes for this purpose. For the decision procedure described in the following section, it does
not particularly matter where a producer’s complexity estimate comes from, only that it has one. Of course, more
accurate estimates of complexity yield more optimal decisions, and therefore greater proﬁt.
For example, a producer that knew it would have 20 iterations to interact with a consumer population could use
this formula to predict its performance using two-part tariff. Two-part tariff has a precision of 0.90, from Table 1, and






. Plugging in these
























































of the available proﬁt (in expectation). By summing this calculation over each iteration from 0
to 19, we get the total proﬁt (per customer). A producer using 2-part tariff for 20 iterations can expect to earn a total



























and a cumulative proﬁt of 11.79, so two-part tariff would be a better model family. At 200



































and cumulative proﬁt of 171.7,




























and a cumulative proﬁt of 176.8. At this point, both schedules are
nearly learned, and block pricing’s higher precision begins to dominate.
5.2 Schedule Selection
Now that we have a way for a producer to compare the performance of different price schedules, we are almost ready
to propose a decision procedure for sequentially selecting schedules. However, there is one more detail to consider.
Our description of complexity tells how quickly a price schedule is learned when the producer is using that schedule.
Recall our previous example that, when linear pricing is offered, the producer also learns something about two-part
tariff. We must characterize the amount of information learned about more complex schedules from experimentation
with simpler ones. We accomplish this using a simple assumption: the inputs of a
< -dimensional schedule are a subset




￿ -dimensional schedule. In other words, a simple schedule can be thought of as a more complex
schedule with some inputs held constant. As a producer is learning a lower-dimensional schedule, it can also update
its model of a more complex schedule. The question then becomes: how quickly is a higher-dimensional schedule
being learned, using the information acquired with a lower-dimensional schedule?
Oursolutionis toweightthenumberofdatapointsseenbythemorecomplexmodelbytheratioofdimensionalities
of the two models. That is, if a producer collected
￿ data points from a model of dimensionality













If we let the total available surplus in a population equal






























( . If we assume that the accuracy of models in a family ﬁts an unskewed distribution so that, in




















number of iterations needed to learn a model in
￿
#









" with an accuracy






























































































































Ifweassume thata producerwill makethis decisiononceandonlyonce,thenthis reducesto theproblemdescribed
in Section 3, and the producer selects the schedule with the highest expected proﬁt. If a producer is able to make
this decision more than once, it can break the
￿ iterations into subintervals and use any algorithm for solving a
Markov decision process, such as dynamic programming or greedy search, to select the optimal series of schedules.
If the number of subintervals is large, the problem will be intractable using an optimal procedure such as dynamic
programming,and so heuristic methods will be necessary.
We implemented this procedure within a producer which continually reexamined its selection of price schedule
every iteration and used a greedy approach; that is, it continually selected the schedule it believed would yield the
greatest aggregate proﬁt in the next iteration, given current information. As in previous sections, the producer used
amoeba to search the proﬁt landscapes. A model of each price schedule was maintained, and all were updated in
parallel.
A graph comparing the performance of an adaptive producer to producers using a ﬁxed price schedule is shown in
Figure 6. As we can see from the graph, the adaptive producer (denoted as ‘Adaptive Pricing’) is able to outperform
most of the static schedules for the majority of the experiment. The schedules used by the adaptive producer are

















































adjusting Linear Two-part Nonlinear Block
Figure 6: Learning curves comparing the performanceof an adaptive pricing producerto producers using ﬁxed sched-
ules. The
￿ axis is the numberof iterations (log scale), and the






) (averaged over 10 runs)
linear pricing for approximately 35 iterations. It then switches to two-part tariff for about 60 iterations before moving
on to block pricing. Finally, at around 300 iterations, it switches to nonlinear pricing. Since the graph averages
performance over a number of iterations, these boundaries are approximate; in different runs, the adaptive producer
changed its schedule at different times. This experiment illustrates how the producer uses the simpler schedules to
bootstrap itself into more complex schedules: linear pricing is two-part tariff with a fee of 0, and two-part tariff is
block pricing with a threshold of 1.
Also, we note that there is no static schedule that dominates adaptive pricing over the course of the entire experi-
ment. This implies that if a producer is unsure of how long it will have to interact with a population, adaptive pricing
is an effective approach. In addition, adaptive pricing performs particularly well in the ‘intermediate’ range of 10-200
iterations. In this range, learning is able to play an important role. If a producer has only a few iterations to interact






experiments shown in Figure 2, where
nonlinearpricing’s randomguesses initially performedwell.) Conversely,if a producerhas a longtime to interact with
a given population, nonlinear schedules can be learned exactly and long-run steady-state proﬁts will dominate.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we have addressed the problem of a monopolist producer selecting a model of a population to learn
when it must account for the cost of learning. We have demonstratedhow, in a single-decision scenario, learning costs
can outweigh optimal proﬁts if there are a small number of periods of interaction. In general, moderately complex
schedules appear to perform well in terms of the exploitation/explorationtradeoff.
Moderately complex schedules, particularly two-part tariff, also perform well under moderate amounts of nonsta-
tionarity. The distribution of their optima allows a learning producer to adapt without too much unnecessary explo-
ration. As the frequency of shocks to the consumer population increases, it becomes more difﬁcult for a producer to
adapt its model in time, and schedules which tend to learn the mean of the generating distribution are more effective
than adaptation.
Finally, we have illustrated how a producer can continually update its selection of schedules, estimating both the
information gained from past experiments with other schedules and the expected future performance of a schedule so
as to make an informed, decision-theoretic selection as to the model(s) that will maximize aggregate proﬁt.
There are still a number of open questions regarding this model. As discussed above, we are working to extend
our estimates of model complexity using statistical characteristics of proﬁt landscapes. Our model of nonstationarity
could also be extended to include an evolutionary approach in which consumer entry and exit is a function of pro-
ducer behavior. Finally, we plan to more closely reconcile this work with our research involving multiple learning
producers [3, 9] and characterize the selection of learning models in a competitive environment.
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